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1. Summary 
Covid-19 is likely to cause much greater economic damage than any recent disease outbreak or 
economic crisis (Shretta, 2020). As of April 2020, the IMF is forecasting that the global economy 
is likely to contract by -3% in 2020 (IMF, 2020c, p. 1) and that ‘the cumulative loss to global GDP 
over 2020 and 2021 from the pandemic crisis could be around 9 trillion dollars’, making it the 
worst economic downturn since the Great Depression (Gopinath, 2020). Economic recovery 
could be swift (the IMF currently forecasts that the world’s economies will grow by 5.8% in 2021) 
(IMF, 2020c, p. 1) but this will require decisive and effective action to control the disease and 
restore economic activity including global value chains. 
Covid-19’s economic impacts are broader and more severe than most past crises. The disease 
has been highly infectious in comparison with past major disease outbreaks, spreading rapidly to 
reach almost every country in the world and infecting more than four million people (Madhav et 
al., 2018, p. 317). In addition, while previous pandemics have typically emerged in poorer 
countries and have had their greatest impact there, Covid-19 emerged in an important economic 
hub and has affected countries central to the global economy: at the beginning of March, the list 
of the ten countries most affected by Covid-19 was ‘almost identical to the list of the ten largest 
economies in the world (Iran and India are the exceptions)’ (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 2). The 
impacts of the disease itself (illness and absenteeism), the policy measures being taken to 
control its spread (closing businesses and schools, and restricting travel and gatherings), and the 
behaviour changes that individuals are making to avoid exposure (avoiding public places and 
reducing consumption, especially in social settings) combine to simultaneously affect supply and 
demand at multiple points in the economy. Most of the economic impacts of Covid-19, as has 
been the case with past epidemics and pandemics, are a side effect of the measures taken to 
control the spread of the disease, rather than a direct effect of the disease itself. 
Covid-19 has greatly disrupted global value chains, which now account for more than two-thirds 
of world trade (Dollar, 2019, p. 1), and disruptions are likely to continue to propagate back and 
forth through these networks as countries restrict economic activity to control the disease 
(Baldwin & Freeman, 2020; Jonas, 2013, p. 10). The experience of value chain disruption during 
the pandemic is likely to feed into future debates about deglobalisation. The manufacturing 
sector will suffer disruption through shutdowns, labour shortages, supply chains and 
transportation disruptions, and declining demand as customers cancel or delay purchases and 
investments (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 4). Small and medium-sized firms that participate 
strongly in global value chains, and manufacturers of durable goods, are particularly vulnerable 
(Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 4; Baldwin & Tomiura, 2020, p. 61; Shretta, 2020). World 
merchandise trade is expected to decline by between 13% and 32% in 2020 (World Trade 
Organization, 2020, p. 1). Large drops in demand for and prices of oil and industrial metals 
(World Bank, 2020a, pp. 3, 8) will cause serious economic harm to countries that export these 
commodities (IMF, 2020c, pp. 5–6). 
Agricultural production and prices have not yet been strongly affected by Covid-19, with the 
exception of crops grown for biofuels and industrial purposes (World Bank, 2020a, pp. 7–8), and 
food security is not currently threatened at the global level. Agricultural commodity prices are 
stable, production levels and stocks of staple foods are near record highs, the prospects for the 
next crop are good, and demand for biofuel crops is likely to contract (Pangestu, 2020; 
Schmidhuber, Pound, & Qiao, 2020, p. 7; World Bank, 2020a, p. 10). However, agriculture and 
food security are at risk of disruption if travel restrictions lead to labour shortages, reduced 
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access to agricultural inputs, or barriers to transporting produce, if countries restrict trade in food, 
or if economic disruption reduces people’s incomes and purchasing power.  
Countries, regions, and cities where service industries account for a large share of GDP are 
likely to be badly affected (Gong, Zhang, Yuan, & Chen, 2020, p. 8). Covid-19 is likely to lead to 
lower consumer and business confidence and decreased personal spending across a broad 
range of categories (Shretta, 2020). Recovery in the service sector is likely to be slow, and some 
economic output will be permanently lost. The travel and tourism sector has been one of the 
hardest hit (Shretta, 2020), as travel restrictions are more widespread and stringent than in any 
previous pandemic response and the combination of economic recession and individual 
reluctance to travel is expected to depress international travel significantly longer than in 
previous pandemics. 
Despite substantial progress on reducing global poverty in the past thirty years, there is a 
significant chance that Covid-19 could lead to 2020 being the first year with an increase in 
poverty levels since 1990 (Sumner, Hoy, & Ortiz-Juarez, 2020). The anticipated economic 
downturn will affect people in or near poverty badly, and is likely to result in millions of people 
falling below the $1.90/day international extreme poverty line (Laborde, Martin, & Vos, 2020). 
Informal employment is widespread in most low- and middle-income countries and is a critical 
source of livelihood for a large proportion of the population. Informal workers, notably home-
based workers, domestic workers, street vendors and market trader, and waste pickers are 
particularly vulnerable during the Covid-19 crisis due to the insecurity of their work, lack of labour 
rights, and inability to rely on social safety nets. Remittances from overseas workers have in the 
past been very important in helping to compensate for crises, but in the current situation, workers 
abroad are also vulnerable, and globally, remittances are projected to drop by about 20% in 2020 
due to falling wages and unemployment of migrant workers (World Bank, 2020b).  
Women and girls are particularly vulnerable to economic hardship, as they are generally in more 
precarious employment than men to begin with, they bear a greater burden of unpaid care work 
which limits their economic participation, and they suffer increased incidences of gender-based 
violence during crises. 
2. Global impact on GDP 
Covid-19 is likely to cause much greater economic damage than any recent disease outbreak or 
financial crisis (Shretta, 2020). As of April 2020, the IMF is forecasting that the global economy is 
likely to contract by -3% in 2020, assuming that ‘the pandemic fades in the second half of 2020 
and containment efforts can be gradually unwound’ (IMF, 2020c, p. 1).  and that ‘the cumulative 
loss to global GDP over 2020 and 2021 from the pandemic crisis could be around 9 trillion 
dollars’ (Gopinath, 2020). Emerging market and developing economies are expected to be less 
hard hit than wealthy countries, with gross domestic product (GDP) shrinking by -1.0% and -6.1% 
respectively (IMF, 2020c, p. ix, 2020d). The IMF’s forecasts for selected countries are shown in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1: Annual percentage change in GDP in selected countries1 
 Annual percentage change in real (inflation-adjusted) GDP 
Country 2019 
2020 
projected 
2021 
projected 
Bangladesh 7.9 2.0 9.5 
Brazil 1.1 -5.3 2.9 
China 6.1 1.2 9.2 
Colombia 3.3 -2.4 3.7 
Egypt 5.6 2.0 2.8 
Ghana 6.1 1.5 5.9 
India 4.2 1.9 7.4 
Indonesia 5.0 0.5 8.2 
Kenya 5.6 1.0 6.1 
Malawi 4.5 1.0 2.5 
Malaysia 4.3 -1.7 9.0 
Mexico  -0.1 -6.6 3.0 
Mozambique 2.2 2.2 4.7 
Myanmar 6.5 1.8 7.5 
Nigeria 2.2 -3.4 2.4 
Pakistan 3.3 -1.5 2.0 
Peru 2.2 -4.5 5.2 
Philippines 5.9 0.6 7.6 
South Africa 0.2 -5.8 4.0 
Sri Lanka 2.3 -0.5 4.2 
Thailand 2.4 -6.7 6.1 
Turkey 0.9 -5.0 5.0 
Vietnam 7.0 2.7 7.0 
Zambia 1.5 -3.5 2.3 
World 2.9 -3.0 5.8 
Emerging market and developing 
economies 
3.7 -1.0 6.6 
Source: IMF, 2020d. Darker green shades indicate more positive growth, darker red shades indicate greater shrinkage. 
Other forecasts of the global effects of the pandemic are in a similar range, but forecasts are 
changing constantly as the situation evolves. On 2 March, the OECD forecast that global 
economic growth would drop by half a percentage point, from 2.9% in 2019 to 2.4% in 2020 
(OECD, 2020a, p. 2). By 14 April, as shutdowns and lockdowns were implemented around the 
world to contain the disease, the OECD published a new forecast saying that the decline in 
                                                   
1 The countries included are the focus countries of the UK Prosperity Fund for 2017-2023. 
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output was ‘equivalent to a decline in annual GDP growth of up to 2 percentage points for each 
month that strict containment measures continue’ and that ‘if the shutdown continued for three 
months, with no offsetting factors, annual GDP growth could be between 4-6 percentage points 
lower than it otherwise might have been’ (OECD, 2020b, p. 1). 
The Centre for Economics and Business Research similarly projected (as of 22 March) that world 
GDP will fall by at least 4.0%, noting that this would be more than twice the drop that occurred in 
2009 as a result of the global financial crisis (Centre for Economics and Business Research, 
2020). 
There is a high degree of uncertainty in these forecasts. ‘The economic fallout depends on 
factors that interact in ways that are hard to predict, including the pathway of the pandemic, the 
intensity and efficacy of containment efforts, the extent of supply disruptions, the repercussions 
of the dramatic tightening in global financial market conditions, shifts in spending patterns, 
behavioural changes (such as people avoiding shopping malls and public transportation), 
confidence effects, and volatile commodity prices’ (IMF, 2020c, p. 1).  
Some estimates of economic losses attributable to other recent epidemics or pandemics are 
shown in Table 2 and Figure 1, although it should be noted that estimates of the economic 
impacts of past epidemics and pandemics vary and are not necessarily directly comparable, as 
there is no widely accepted, consistent methodology for estimating the economic impacts of 
pandemics (Gong et al., 2020, p. 2; Madhav et al., 2018, p. 316). SARS is the most damaging 
disease outbreak, in terms of percentage of GDP lost, for which estimates of global economic 
impact exist. It is estimated to have cost the global economy US$40 billion to $54 billion, or about 
0.1% of global GDP at the time (Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, 2019, p. 13; Lee & 
McKibbin, 2004a, p. 107). The economic losses attributed to other recent disease outbreaks 
have all been less than 0.1% of global GDP at the time of the event. 
Figure 1: Estimated economic losses attributed to selected epidemics/pandemics 
 
Source: Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, 2019, p. 13. Used under license (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO). 
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Table 2: Notable epidemics and pandemics in the post-war era 
Starting 
year  
Event Geographic 
extent 
Estimated direct morbidity 
or mortality 
Estimated 
global 
economic 
losses 
1981  
 
HIV/AIDS 
pandemic 
Global  
 
More than 70 million 
infections, 36.7 million 
deaths 
 
2003 SARS epidemic 4 continents, 37 
countries 
8,098 possible cases, 744 
deaths 
US$40 billiona 
to $54 billionb 
2009 H1N1 ‘swine flu’ 
pandemic 
Global 151,700 - 575,500 deaths US$45 to 55 
billiona 
2012 MERS epidemic 22 countries 1,879 symptomatic cases, 
659 deaths 
US$10 billiona 
2013 West Africa 
Ebola virus 
disease 
epidemic 
10 countries 28,646 cases, 11,323 
deaths 
US$53 billiona 
2015 Zika virus 
pandemic 
76 countries 2,656 reported cases of 
microcephaly or central 
nervous system 
malformation 
US$7 to $18 
billionc 
2019 Covid-19 Global (185 
countries and 
territories) 
4.1 million confirmed 
cases, 283,000 deaths as 
of 11 May 2020 
US$9 trilliond 
Source: Most data from Madhav et al., 2018, p. 317. Data for Covid-19 from Johns Hopkins University, 2020 as of 11 May 
2020. Indicative global economic losses from: (a) Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, 2019, p. 13, (b) Jonas, 2013, p. 2, 
(c) UNDP, 2017, p. 8, (d) Gopinath, 2020. 
Several studies have attempted to model the range of economic impacts of a major global 
pandemic. One World Bank study suggests that an influenza pandemic on the scale of the 1918 
Spanish flu could cause economic losses equivalent to 3.1% of global GDP (Burns, 
Mensbrugghe, & Timmer, 2008, p. 3). A study published in the Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization projected economic losses from a moderate to severe influenza pandemic of 1.6% 
of gross national income (GNI) for lower-middle-income countries and 1.0% for upper-middle-
income countries (Fan, Jamison, & Summers, 2018, p. 131). Another study from the Australian 
National University modelled a range of outcomes including a ‘mild’ scenario similar to the 1968-
69 Hong Kong flu that might reduce world economic output by 0.7%, a ‘moderate’ scenario 
similar to the 1957 Asian flu that might reduce output by 2.0%, a ‘severe’ scenario similar to the 
1918 Spanish flu that might reduce output by 4.8%, and a catastrophic ‘ultra’ scenario which 
simulates a pandemic worse than any seen in the past century that would lead to losses of 
12.6% (Burns et al., 2008, p. 2; McKibbin & Sidorenko, 2006, p. 26). Current IMF and OECD 
forecasts for Covid-19’s impact in 2020 are in line with these scenarios, although well below 
McKibben and Sidorenko’s ‘ultra’ scenario. 
Economic recovery from Covid-19 will depend on how quickly the disease can be brought under 
control, how quickly consumer and investor confidence can be restored, whether companies are 
able to find substitutes for parts of their supply chains that are disrupted, and the effectiveness of 
actions taken to support workers and companies to prevent widespread bankruptcies, extended 
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job losses, and system-wide financial strains (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 17; IMF, 2020c, p. 6; 
OECD, 2020b, p. 2). The IMF currently forecasts that the world’s economies will bounce back 
quickly from the expected 3.0% contraction in 2020, and grow by 5.8% in 2021 (4.5% in the 
wealthier countries and 6.6% in emerging markets and developing economies) (IMF, 2020c, pp. 
1, 6).  
Previous comparable crises have tended to produce quite short, sharp economic shocks 
(Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 17). The economic impacts of SARS in 2003, for example, lasted 
about six months in all (IATA, 2020b, 2020c; Lee & McKibbin, 2004b, p. 119). In most of the 
countries it affected, losses only affected one to three months of economic activity and were 
followed by gains so that ‘over a year the effect was marginal at best’ (Keogh-Brown & Smith, 
2008, p. 114). Global GDP growth also recovered rapidly: from global shrinkage of -0.1% in 2009 
to growth of 5.4% in 2010 (IMF, 2020c, p. 6).  
Baldwin (2020b), however, suggests that the Covid-19 shock may last much longer. He argues 
that when restrictions are relaxed, we should expect to see recurring waves of infection that will 
depend on when restrictions aimed at controlling the spread of the disease are lifted in different 
places, and that the interdependencies of global value chains, which are more significant today 
than in past crises, will hamper economies from restarting smoothly (see global value chains 
section below). Baldwin and di Mauro (2020, p. 17) suggest that inappropriate macroeconomic 
policy responses could lead to a situation like the ‘stagflation’ of the 1970s (Baldwin & di Mauro, 
2020, p. 17). 
3. Pathways of economic impact 
Covid-19’s effect on the global economy is broader and more severe than most epidemics, 
pandemics, and economic crises of recent decades. Most recessions are triggered by a lack of 
spending, which governments can address through stimulus, but Covid-19 is interrupting 
economic activity at multiple points, creating a complex combination of supply and demand 
shocks at the same time (Baldwin, 2020b, 2020a, p. 5) (see Figure 2) . 
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Figure 2: Economic cycles interrupted by Covid-19 
 
Source: Baldwin, 2020a, p. 5. Used with permission. 
Covid-19’s economic impacts are projected to be much larger than any other recent disease 
outbreak because of how quickly it has spread and where it has emerged. Covid-19 has been 
highly infectious, reaching almost every country in the world in four months, and has already 
caused four million confirmed infections, which is more than any post-war epidemic or pandemic 
except HIV/AIDS and 2009 H1N1 influenza (Table 2). In addition, while previous pandemics have 
typically emerged in poorer countries and have had their greatest impact there, Covid-19 
emerged in an important economic hub and has affected countries central to the global economy: 
at the beginning of March, the list of the ten countries most affected by Covid-19 was ‘almost 
identical to the list of the ten largest economies in the world (Iran and India are the exceptions)’ 
(Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 2). 
It is well established that the economic impacts of epidemics and pandemics are due more to the 
measures taken to control the spread of the disease, and to behaviour change caused by fear of 
the disease, than to the direct costs and health impacts of the disease. Policy measures such as 
closing borders, schools, businesses, and transport services; restrictions on mass gatherings; 
physical distancing requirements and other disease-control measures; combined with choices of 
individuals and businesses such as avoiding travel, avoiding social activities and public spaces 
including shops, restaurants, and other services, and delaying purchases deliver multiple 
simultaneous shocks to the economy (Evans & Over, 2020; Gong et al., 2020; Jonas, 2013; 
Madhav et al., 2018; Mauro, 2020; Shretta, 2020; World Bank, 2014; Wren-Lewis, 2020). A 
World Bank study modelling the economic impacts of a serious influenza pandemic suggests that 
in low- and middle-income countries, 58% of the total economic impact would come from efforts 
to avoid infection (Burns et al., 2008, p. 4).  
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4. Impacts by sector  
Global value chain disruption  
More than two thirds of world trade now occurs through global value chains, in which 
production crosses one or more borders before final assembly (Dollar, 2019, p. 1). 
Disruptions to production, travel, or capital movements can cause a cascade of impacts 
through regional and global trade networks (Jonas, 2013, p. 10). The impacts of Covid-19 
are likely to propagate back and forth along value chains as countries restrict economic 
activity to control the disease (Baldwin & Freeman, 2020). The experience of value chain 
disruption during the pandemic is likely to feed into future debates about deglobalisation. 
China is a central hub for world trade and industrial components made in China are important to 
manufacturing processes around the world (Baldwin & Tomiura, 2020, pp. 60–61; Li, Meng, & 
Wang, 2019). When manufacturing in China was first disrupted by Covid-19, ‘supply chain 
contagion’ spread initially to the countries most closely linked to China in regional trade networks, 
notably South Korea and Japan, but soon affected most of the world (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, 
pp. 15–16; Baldwin & Tomiura, 2020, pp. 60–61). In turn, China, South Korea, and Japan 
together account for more than 25% of US imports, including more than 50% of US imports of 
computer and electronics products, so the loss of capacity in these three countries quickly 
affected production in the US (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 20). China’s manufacturing outputs 
are particularly significant to Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan, where they constitute 14%, 16%, 
and 17% respectively of the value of inputs; similarly, 4.8% of the UK's total manufacturing 
production relies upon Chinese inputs (Baldwin & Freeman, 2020). The complexity and shape of 
value chains varies from one sector to another (see Figure 3). 
Disruptions in global trade can proceed in both directions up and down value chains. As 
countries restrict economic activity in an effort to contain Covid-19, countries that supply 
components find themselves without customers, leading to industrial ‘contagion’ and ‘reinfection’ 
propagating back along the value chain (Baldwin & Freeman, 2020). Trade is likely to fall more 
steeply in sectors with complex value chains, notably electronics and automotive products (World 
Trade Organization, 2020, p. 4). Countries that are less tightly integrated in international supply 
chains may be less affected; India, for example, is the world’s seventh largest economy but is not 
very involved in supply chains, ‘so may be shielded somewhat from this form of economic 
contagion’ (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 16). 
The most complex supply chains are regional; for example, China is the main hub for Asian 
manufacturing, the USA the hub for North America, and Germany the hub for Europe. During a 
crisis, regional coordination efforts among close trading partners could perhaps help keep supply 
chains operating and sustain manufacturing capacity (Baldwin & Freeman, 2020). 
The textile and garment sector is particularly highly integrated in global value chains, with a 
particular concentration in East Asia. China is ‘the workshop of the world when it comes to textile 
sector inputs’ and is the central hub for global trade, which makes the sector particularly 
vulnerable to disruptions in East Asia (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 20; Baldwin & Tomiura, 
2020, p. 62). Italy plays a similar role as a trading hub in Europe; there are no similar hubs for the 
textile sector in Africa and South America (Baldwin & Tomiura, 2020, p. 62). 
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Figure 3: Supply hubs for global trade networks 
           
Source: Li, Meng, & Wang, 2019. Traditional trade consists of products that cross borders once for final consumption; simple global value chains involve components that cross borders once before final assembly and 
consumption; complex global value chains involve components crossing borders during production, and where final products are then also exported. Countries and territories are identified using International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) codes; the principal hubs are CHN = China, DEU = Germany, and USA = United States of America. Copyright World Trade Organization, reproduction for non-commercial 
purposes permitted.
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The experience of disruption in global value chains may stimulate discussions about 
deglobalisation. Companies may increasingly consider ‘decoupling’ (loosening value chain links) 
and ‘reshoring’ (reducing reliance on overseas production) with the aim of making supply chains 
more resilient (UNCTAD, 2020, p. 4), supported by ideas about strengthening national security 
by shortening supply chains for critical items (World Bank, 2020a, p. 14). Such arguments are 
likely to find support in times of rising nationalism and populism, where fears and suspicions of 
‘others’ might become a force for disintegration and deglobalisation (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, 
p. 22). However, global value chains arose out of efforts to improve efficiency and productivity, 
and major changes to current systems would be a major undertaking and would likely increase 
costs of production (Baldwin & Tomiura, 2020, p. 68). Global value chains also reduce risk 
through spreading production among multiple sites rather than centralising it, so there are also 
arguments for extending value chains to include redundant sourcing from multiple countries to 
reduce current levels of dependence on hubs like China (Baldwin & Tomiura, 2020, p. 68).  
Manufacturing and trade in goods 
The manufacturing sector will suffer disruption through shutdowns, labour shortages, 
supply chains and transportation disruptions, and declining demand as customers cancel 
or delay purchases and investments (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 4). Small and medium-
sized firms that participate strongly in global value chains are particularly vulnerable 
(Shretta, 2020). Manufacturers of durable goods are likely to be affected by a sharp, short-
term drop in demand but may also see rapid recovery (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 4; 
Baldwin & Tomiura, 2020, p. 61). World merchandise trade is expected to decline by 
between 13% and 32% in 2020 (World Trade Organization, 2020, p. 1). 
The manufacturing sector will suffer a supply side shock as businesses are required to shut 
down and as a result of labour shortages; disruptions to supply chains and transportation 
services that interrupt inputs and render markets less accessible; and a reduction in aggregate 
demand as customers cancel or delay purchases and investments (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 
4). International media and personal communications can transmit and amplify uncertainty and 
create a crisis of confidence among businesses and individual consumers. During the global 
financial crisis of 2008-09, this contributed to turning the initial financial shock into a massive, 
synchronised global demand shock in which ‘trade volumes collapsed at the same time in all 
nations and for almost all products at a pace never seen before’ (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, pp. 
16–17). 
In past epidemics and economic crises, the most vulnerable industries were those linked most 
closely to the affected locations. For example, following floods in Thailand in 2011, impacts down 
to the level of individual factories were known almost immediately based on the altitude of the 
factory. Similarly, after earthquakes in Japan in 2011, damage was directly related to distance 
from the epicentre of the earthquakes (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 14). During the SARS 
epidemic of 2003, infections were sufficiently localised that factories in Hong Kong could house 
workers in hotels to isolate them from nearby communities and continue operating, which 
actually led to an increase in the value of Hong Kong’s exports during the outbreak (Gong et al., 
2020, p. 6). Covid-19, however, has spread rapidly throughout the world and is affecting many 
countries simultaneously through the effects of the disease and by disrupting global supply 
chains.  
The slowdown in economic activity and the restrictions put in place to control the spread of the 
disease will impact companies around the world involved in manufacturing or in producing raw 
materials used in manufacturing. ‘Small and medium-sized firms, especially firms that rely on 
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intermediate goods from affected regions and which are unable to easily switch sourcing these 
goods, may have greater difficulty surviving the disruption’, as will businesses that have highly 
concentrated trade exposures to the EU and the US (Shretta, 2020). Durable goods tend to be 
more vulnerable to demand shocks than non-durable goods, as seen following the global 
financial crisis of 2008, because purchases are more easily deferrable (Baldwin & di Mauro, 
2020, p. 4; Baldwin & Tomiura, 2020, p. 61).  
World merchandise trade is expected to decline by between 13% and 32% in 2020 due to the 
Covid-19 pandemic (see Figure 4). There is widespread uncertainty about this forecast, but ‘the 
decline will likely exceed the trade slump brought on by the global financial crisis of 2008-09’ 
(World Trade Organization, 2020, p. 1).  
Figure 4: World merchandise trade volume 
 
Source: World Trade Organization, 2020, p. 2. Copyright World Trade Organization, reproduction for non-commercial purposes 
permitted. 
Other crises have similarly affected international trade even when the epidemics have been 
localised. For example, the 2014 Ebola outbreak was confined to a small part of West Africa, but 
caused merchandise exports from the USA to the affected countries to drop by US$1.08 billion, 
and led to 12,200 jobs lost in the USA (Delivorias & Scholz, 2020, pp. 3–4). The most severe 
drop in global trade in recent times was the ‘great trade collapse’ that followed the global 
financial crisis of 2008-09, much of which involved ‘postpone-able’ purchases of durable goods 
(Baldwin & Tomiura, 2020, p. 67).  
The longer-term outlook is highly uncertain at this point. The WTO suggests that a short, sharp 
drop in trade could be followed by recovery in 2021 to nearly the trend of the past decade, but a 
deeper decline followed by a slower and less complete recovery could also be possible (World 
Trade Organization, 2020, p. 3). A strong rebound is more likely if disease control measures 
work quickly to keep the pandemic short and businesses and consumers view it as a temporary, 
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one-time shock (Gong et al., 2020, pp. 6–7; World Trade Organization, 2020, p. 3). Returning 
industries to full production and reactivating supply chains after a severe and lengthy shutdown 
will be challenging (Shretta, 2020) and ‘if the outbreak is prolonged and/or recurring uncertainty 
becomes pervasive, households and business are likely to spend more cautiously’ (World Trade 
Organization, 2020, p. 3).  
A significant proportion of manufacturing output may be delayed, rather than completely lost, 
allowing production to ‘rebound to restock inventories once quarantines end and factories 
reopen’ (Mann, 2020, p. 82). For example, China accounts for up to 40% of the German car 
industry’s revenues, and although sales have collapsed during the crisis, one might expect sales 
to recover when the situation normalises (Mauro, 2020, p. 33). However, not all trade will recover 
quickly, and after the financial crisis of 2008-09, although trade recovered to pre-crisis levels 
quickly, further growth in trade has remained below its previous trend (World Trade Organization, 
2020, p. 3). 
Extractive industries 
The economic disruptions associated with Covid-19 have led to large drops in demand for 
and prices of energy, especially oil, and industrial metals (World Bank, 2020a, pp. 3, 8). 
Falling commodity prices will cause economic disruption and undermine investment and 
growth in countries that produce and export oil and metals, but could potentially be 
positive for some importers, business users, and consumers (Mann, 2020, pp. 82–83). 
Oil markets have been severely affected, due to the decline in general economic activity and 
especially in transportation, which accounts for two-thirds of global oil demand. Oil prices fell by 
two-thirds from January to April, the steepest one-month decline on record, exacerbated by the 
collapse of an agreement between OPEC and its partners which led to a glut of production 
(World Bank, 2020a, pp. 7–9). Oil exporting countries will suffer declining revenues and are 
expected to see their economies shrink by 4.4% in 2020 (IMF, 2020c, pp. 5–6). Nigeria, which 
relies on oil for 90% of the value of its exports, is forecast (as of 22 April) to suffer a 3.4% 
shrinkage in GDP in 2020 largely due to the collapse of oil prices (IMF, 2020b, 2020a). 
The prices of most industrial metals have fallen, but not as dramatically as oil prices. The largest 
declines have been in copper and zinc, with declines of around 15% since January (World Bank, 
2020a, p. 10). The decline in demand and prices will affect low- and middle-income countries that 
export oil and metals until global value chains are re-established and demand resumes. 
Currently, some 15% of global copper mines and 20% of zinc mines are either offline or 
operating at reduced capacity, and new projects are on hold in copper-producing countries 
(World Bank, 2020a, pp. 9–10). 
Compared with previous global recessions and pandemics, current swings in metal prices and 
agricultural prices are no greater than in previous experience, except for oil prices which have set 
dramatic new lows (World Bank, 2020a, p. 12). During recessions, it is typical for oil and copper 
prices to fall, while agricultural prices have been less affected; the sharpest declines in previous 
recessions occurred in 2009, when oil and copper fell by about 60% in three months and 
agricultural prices fell by 40% (partly due to returning from historic highs in 2008) (World Bank, 
2020a, p. 12). 
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Figure 5: Prices of oil, copper, and gold in previous crises 
Oil prices 
 
Copper prices 
 
Gold prices 
 
Source: Adapted from World Bank, 2020a, p. 12. Grey shaded areas show the range of commodity price movements in global 
recessions in 1974, 1981, 1990, and 2008. Used under license (CC BY 3.0 IGO). 
In the long term, new patterns of working at home, substitution of video conferencing for travel, 
continuing travel restrictions, and reluctance of individuals to travel could contribute to a 
permanent reduction in demand for travel and fuel (World Bank, 2020a, pp. 7, 14). Pressures to 
unwind global value chains, re-shore production, and substitute domestic commodities for 
imported ones could further reduce demand (World Bank, 2020a, p. 7). If such developments 
result in a permanent reduction in demand for oil, they would reduce export and fiscal revenues 
for oil exporters, and lead to improved current account balances for oil importers (World Bank, 
2020a, p. 14). The drop in oil prices could provide an opportunity to eliminate domestic energy 
subsidies (World Bank, 2020a, p. 7); in April, Nigeria removed its petrol subsidy (Munshi & 
Pilling, 2020), which had been popular with the public but disproportionately benefited wealthier 
people and large businesses who consumed more fuel (Oxford Business Group, 2019). 
Agriculture  
In many middle-income countries, agriculture contributes a large proportion of value to 
GDP and is critical to employment and livelihoods. Agricultural production and prices 
have not yet been strongly affected by Covid-19, with the exception of crops grown for 
biofuels and industrial purposes (World Bank, 2020a, pp. 7–8). However, the agriculture 
sector is at risk of serious disruption if travel restrictions are maintained and lead to 
labour shortages, reduced access to agricultural inputs, or barriers to transporting 
produce. 
Global agricultural markets have not yet been strongly affected by the Covid-19 crisis. Prices of 
the main food commodities declined about 9% between January and April, but are within the 
ranges seen during previous crises (World Bank, 2020a, pp. 10–12).  
Demand for non-food agricultural products is expected to decline with declining industrial activity 
worldwide. Natural rubber, for example, is used mostly for manufacturing tires, and prices have 
already dropped by 25% (World Bank, 2020a, p. 10). Demand for crops used in biofuels, such as 
corn and soybeans, has also declined in parallel with oil and gasoline (World Bank, 2020a, p. 
10). Kenya’s exports of fresh flowers to European markets have dropped by 75% to 80% amidst 
travel disruptions between East Africa and Europe, and their production is also being affected by 
disruption to inputs (World Bank, 2020a, p. 11). 
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Figure 6: Average price index for wheat, corn, and soybeans in previous crises 
 
Source: World Bank, 2020a, p. 12. Grey shaded area shows the range of commodity price movements in global recessions in 
1974, 1981, 1990, and 2008. Agricultural commodities included are wheat, corn, and soybeans. Used under license (CC BY 3.0 
IGO). 
The agriculture sector is heavily dependent on migrant labour, and availability of workers is 
increasingly becoming a problem, especially in labour-intensive sub-sectors such as fruits, 
vegetables, meat, and dairy production (World Bank, 2020a, p. 11). Labour shortages could pose 
a serious risk to food production if travel is restricted in the long term, if workers are unwilling to 
travel (both within their own countries and across borders), or if safe working conditions including 
protective equipment are not available (Pangestu, 2020; World Bank, 2020a, pp. 8–9). Labour 
shortages at the beginning of the Ebola outbreak in 2014, for example, led to a 20% drop in rice 
production and a 50% drop in coffee production in Ghana, which caused a national food crisis 
and greatly affected farmers’ incomes (Gong et al., 2020, p. 5).  
Farmers also need to obtain agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilisers, and pesticides, and to 
transport produce to market. Travel restrictions that affect these movements could adversely 
affect food production (Pangestu, 2020; World Bank, 2020a, pp. 8–9). For example, 
transportation costs of pesticides to East Africa have increased by a factor of three and shipping 
is delayed because of the reduced number of flights operating to the region, which is hampering 
the ability to contain a locust outbreak (Schmidhuber et al., 2020, p. 12). In the Ebola outbreak in 
2013, vegetable traders selling perishable goods lost much of their produce because of travel 
restrictions and the closure of local markets (African Development Bank, 2016, p. 26). 
Some factors that significantly harmed the agriculture sector in previous pandemics do not 
appear to be likely to play a significant role in relation to Covid-19. In past pandemics where 
livestock were involved in transmitting the disease, control measures included destroying large 
numbers of livestock, which caused extensive and sometimes long-lasting economic damage. 
For example, during the 1998 Nipah virus outbreak in Malaysia, 1.1 million pigs were culled and 
many pig farmers were forced out of business into other jobs, but were never able to regain their 
former economic status (Smith, Machalaba, Seifman, Feferholtz, & Karesh, 2019, p. 3). Public 
misinformation also played a role in some previous pandemics. For example, during the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic, popularly referred to as ‘swine flu’, many consumers chose to avoid pork 
products; consumers in China reduced consumption significantly and imports fell by 56% due to 
trade restrictions (Gong et al., 2020, pp. 5–6). Outbreaks of avian influenza in 2005-06 similarly 
reduced global demand for poultry products and the prices that producers could achieve (FAO, 
2020, p. 6). 
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Retail and other services 
Countries, regions, and cities where service industries account for a large share of GDP 
are likely to be badly affected by Covid-19 (Gong et al., 2020, p. 8). The disease is likely to 
lead to lower consumer and business confidence and decreased personal spending 
across a broad range of categories (Shretta, 2020). Recovery in this sector is likely to be 
slow, and some economic output will be permanently lost. 
Service industries are expected to suffer from transport and travel restrictions and the closure of 
retail, hospitality, entertainment, cultural, and other businesses (World Trade Organization, 2020, 
p. 4). Non-essential goods, luxury goods and restaurants are likely to be hit hard (Shretta, 2020). 
Food, consumer goods, financial services, and medical services are likely to suffer less as they 
tend to be essential, and purchasing these goods does not involve a high risk of infection 
(Baldwin & Tomiura, 2020, p. 66; Shretta, 2020).  
During the SARS outbreak in 2003, retail sales growth in China declined by almost 3 percentage 
points during the second quarter of 2003 (Shretta, 2020). During the 2015 MERS outbreak in 
South Korea, the accommodation and food sectors experienced a 10% drop in production from 
the previous year; the entertainment and recreation sector dropped 8.6%; publishing, 
communication and information sectors dropped 6.3%; transportation and storage dropped 2.4%; 
wholesale and retail dropped 1.6%; and electricity and air conditioning dropped by 0.9% (Smith 
et al., 2019, p. 3).  
In the longer term, services are likely to experience an ‘L’ shaped (gradual) recovery and the 
shock to ‘non-storable’ tourism, transportation, and domestic services will not be recovered 
(Mann, 2020, p. 82). Information technology services could be an exception, as these are in high 
demand, and services that can be provided remotely could see opportunities opening up 
(Baldwin & Tomiura, 2020, p. 66; World Trade Organization, 2020, p. 4), but these are largely 
provided by companies based in the wealthier countries of the world. 
Travel and tourism 
The travel and tourism sector has been one of the hardest hit by the Covid-19 pandemic 
(Shretta, 2020). Travel restrictions are more widespread and stringent than in any 
previous pandemic response, and the combination of economic recession and individual 
reluctance to travel is expected to depress international travel significantly longer than in 
previous pandemics. The countries likely to be affected most are those that rely heavily 
on international tourism. 
The travel and tourism sector is responsible for more than 10% of global GDP, 7% of all 
international trade, and 30% of the world’s exports in services (World Bank, 2017, p. 8). In lower- 
and middle-income countries, tourism directly contributes 4.5% to 6.3% of GDP (Jansen, 2013, 
pp. 17–18) (see Table 3). The tourism sector is highly labour-intensive, with women making up 
60% to 70% of the workforce and half of the workforce being under 25 years old (ILO, 2011, cited 
in Jansen, 2013, p. 17). 
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Table 3: Tourism sector contributions to GDP and employment, 2006-2011 
 Tourism sector  
contribution to GDP 
Tourism sector  
contribution to employment 
 Direct Direct + 
Indirect 
Direct Direct + 
Indirect 
Lower-middle-income countries 4.5% 11.5% 4.1% 10.4% 
Upper-middle-income countries 6.3% 18.0% 6.3% 17.3% 
Source: World Travel and Tourism Council estimates cited in Jansen, 2013, pp. 17–18. Direct contributions to GDP and 
employment relate to tourist services such as accommodation, transportation, and entertainment. Indirect contributions include 
other sectors of the economy such as sales of local handicrafts and hotels purchasing supplies and equipment locally. 
Previous epidemics have had relatively short, sharp impacts on the tourism sector. In Mexico, 
where tourism is the country’s largest service sector and third largest source of foreign exchange 
earnings, the H1N1 influenza pandemic led to a loss of US$2.8 billion over five months (Rassy & 
Smith, 2013). Similarly, the impact of SARS in 2003 on tourism earnings is estimated at US$3.5 
billion in China and US$1.7 billion in Malaysia (Keogh-Brown & Smith, 2008, p. 115) and GDP 
growth across east and southeast Asia was reduced by between 0.2% and 1.8% (Gong et al., 
2020, p. 9). SARS was the most serious disease outbreak to date in its effect on international air 
travel, but the impacts were short-lived, with international air passenger traffic returning to pre-
crisis levels within six months (IATA, 2020b, 2020c).  
As of the end of April 2020, every country and territory in the world had imposed travel 
restrictions related to Covid-19, including totally closing borders to tourists, suspending 
international flights, banning entry to people arriving from or transiting through particular 
countries, or requiring quarantine or self-isolation measures – measures that have never been so 
extreme or widespread (UNWTO, 2020a). International tourist arrivals are forecast to decline in 
2020 by up to 30%, with a loss of international tourism receipts of up to US$450 billion (UNWTO, 
2020b), which is approximately ten times the global financial impact of the SARS epidemic 
(Shretta, 2020).  
Covid-19 is expected to depress international travel for significantly longer than previous 
pandemics due to the combination of a serious global recession and lack of passenger 
confidence. In an airline industry survey conducted in April, nearly 40% of respondents indicated 
that they would wait six months or more after official travel restrictions are lifted before they 
would consider travelling by air again (IATA, 2020a). Recent trends towards remote working and 
video conferencing could potentially reduce demand for overseas travel in the long term (World 
Bank, 2020a, p. 14). 
Labour shortages 
Businesses that are able to continue operating through the pandemic are expected to 
experience shortages of labour due to workers becoming ill or needing to care for family 
members who are ill, because of the measures that individuals take to avoid exposure to 
disease, and because of official measures taken to control the disease, like school 
closures. Illness and absenteeism are expected to account for 25% of the total economic 
impact of a pandemic in low- and middle-income countries (Burns et al., 2008, p. 4). 
Illness leads directly to absenteeism and reduced productivity, but labour force participation also 
drops where one or more members of a household become infected and workers have to stay 
home to care for their relatives, or are required to remain in quarantine to prevent further spread 
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of the disease (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 13). Experience from the Ebola outbreak in 2013 
indicates that the effect on the labour pool, and on economic activity, is closely related to the 
number of cases of disease present in the population, and so can be influenced by effectively 
controlling the disease outbreak directly (World Bank, 2014, p. 6). 
People may also seek to avoid working, if they have that option, to limit their exposure to others 
(Madhav et al., 2018, p. 324), and school closures reduce labour participation as workers have to 
stay at home to look after children (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 13). Experience from the Ebola 
outbreak in 2013 indicates that the effect of such ‘behavioural’ factors on the labour pool is less 
sensitive to the number of cases of disease in the population, but is potentially sensitive to 
information campaigns and safety measures aimed at protecting and reassuring workers (World 
Bank, 2014, p. 6). 
A World Bank study estimating the economic impacts of a serious influenza pandemic suggests 
that in low- and middle-income countries, 25% of the total economic impact would come from lost 
production due to illness and absenteeism (Burns et al., 2008, p. 4). Labour-intensive industries 
‘such as public order, transport, education, health care, [and] retail commerce’ and networked 
industries ‘such as banking, utilities, and communications’ are expected to be the worst affected 
(Jonas, 2013, p. 11). In some industries and job functions, digital technology can be used to help 
sustain labour force participation through remote working (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 13). 
During the 2013 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, for example, ‘the supply of labour declined due 
to deaths as a result of EVD [Ebola Virus Disease], the departure of expatriates, the burden of 
care on households, the migration of workers to escape the disease, and the unwillingness to 
engage in collective activities (as farmers refused to participate in the harvest and office workers 
stayed home from many private firms and public sector institutions)’ (Amara, Tommy, & Kamara, 
2017, p. 21). In Chile, the 2009 H1N1 pandemic is estimated to have led to a loss of at least 
US$16 million in labour productivity due to days of work missed due to illness, not including the 
indirect reasons for absenteeism noted above (Duarte, Kadiyala, Masters, & Powell, 2016, p. 14). 
Financial markets 
There does not yet appear to be evidence of destabilisation of financial markets occurring 
as a result of Covid-19, but there is some risk that the impacts of the pandemic could spill 
over from the ‘real economy’ to financial markets if disruption to business activities 
creates excessive financial problems for firms, or if large losses occur in equity and bond 
markets, eroding investor confidence (Shretta, 2020). Central banks and governments 
have already intervened heavily in financial markets to provide stability, and continue to 
do so. 
Exchange rate fluctuations have been a driver of contagion in past financial crises. In the Asian 
financial crisis of the late 1990s, for example, companies and countries that had borrowed in one 
currency while earning income in another were vulnerable to exchange rate movements, and the 
devaluation of the Thai baht made debt owed in foreign currency unsustainable. So far in the 
current Covid-19 crisis, ‘there is no hint of this mechanism in play’ and the lessons of past 
financial crises mean that the risk of such events has been reduced (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, 
p. 23). 
Foreign direct investment is likely to fall by 5% to 15% in 2020, with impacts concentrated in 
countries that have been forced to take the most drastic measures to contain the spread of 
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Covid-19 (UNCTAD, 2020, pp. 1–2)2. Other observers concur that foreign direct investment is 
likely to be delayed at least in the short term as part of the global decline in aggregate demand 
(Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 4) and as a result of increased uncertainty, as was seen for 
example during the Ebola crisis of 2013 (UNDP, 2014, p. 15). Some observers note, however, 
that the core arguments for investments may remain valid and that investment flows could only 
be delayed, rather than lost entirely, assuming that the pandemic is brought under control (Evans 
& Over, 2020). 
Stability of financial institutions is not yet expected to be a serious problem in the Covid-19 
crisis, unlike in past economic crises (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020, p. 18). Compared with the time 
of the global financial crisis, banks’ capital reserves are higher, regulatory frameworks better able 
to deal with crises, and stress tests more stringent (Beck, 2020). To keep financial system risks 
low and reduce the possibility of panics and bank runs, it has been suggested that policy-makers 
should be transparent and honest to support confidence in the banking system (Beck, 2020; 
Cecchetti & Schoenholtz, 2020). 
The microfinance sector may be hit hard by the Covid-19 economic crash as borrowers lose 
their incomes and become unable to service loans. Surveys conducted in Pakistan in April, for 
example, found that week-on-week sales and household incomes of borrowers had fallen by 
about 90%, with 70% of borrowers reporting that they could not repay their loans and loan 
officers reporting that they expected a repayment rate of just 34% in April (Malik et al., 2020). 
The Asian financial crisis and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 ‘disrupted global capital 
markets… [but] had relatively little impact on the day-to-day economic lives of the microfinance 
clientele’ and so had limited impact on microfinance institutions (Malik et al., 2020, pp. 32–33). 
During the Covid-19 crisis, however, microfinance institutions are suffering both from a lack of 
repayments and from difficulty accessing capital and liquidity from larger funders, which is 
creating a major crisis for the microfinance industry (Bull & Ogden, 2020; Malik et al., 2020, pp. 
32–33).  
5. Impacts on populations 
Food security 
Food security is not currently threatened at the global level by Covid-19. Agricultural 
commodity prices are stable and are expected to remain stable in 2020. Production levels 
and stocks of most staple foods are near record highs, the prospects for the next crop are 
good, and demand for biofuel crops is likely to contract (Pangestu, 2020; Schmidhuber et 
al., 2020, p. 7; World Bank, 2020a, p. 10). Risks to food security could arise if countries 
restrict trade in food, if travel restrictions affect migrant workers and the transportation of 
agricultural inputs and products, or if economic disruption reduces people’s incomes and 
purchasing power. 
The greatest risk to food security at the global level is the risk of countries restricting the trade of 
food, or that general travel restrictions might hinder trade. In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, 
26 countries had implemented restrictions on exporting food as of 17 April 2020 (Evenett, 2020, 
p. 7). For example, Vietnam, the world’s third largest rice exporter, imposed a temporary ban on 
                                                   
2 This forecast was made in March based on projections of GDP shrinkage of -0.5% to -1.5%. Projections for 
GDP have been revised downwards since then, which could suggest worse prospects for FDI as well. 
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exports, although this has since been lifted (Pangestu, 2020). Trade restrictions can lead to rapid 
increases in food prices that hit poor countries hard: for example, during the 2007-08 food crisis, 
as many as one-third of the world’s countries adopted trade restrictions which increased prices 
on basic commodities like wheat and rice, and contributed to the number of undernourished 
people in the world increasing by 114 million (FAO, 2020, p. 5; World Bank, 2020a, p. 9). At 
present, there does not appear to be a significant risk of either food shortages or a move towards 
extensive restrictions on trade, but these factors can change rapidly (Evenett, 2020). Excess 
buying by some importers (including Philippines for rice and Egypt for wheat) is also a cause for 
concern as this could also drive up prices (World Bank, 2020a, p. 10). 
Disease outbreaks in the past have not had a measurable effect on commodity demand or 
supply at the global level, but have adversely affected food security and nutrition in local areas, 
particularly for vulnerable populations including children, women, the elderly, and the poor (World 
Bank, 2020a, p. 13). During the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014, for example, containment 
measures disrupted agricultural supply chains and many farmers were unable to grow or sell 
crops due to lack of inputs, lack of labour, or closed markets, which led to restricted food supplies 
and increased prices (FAO, 2020, p. 5).  
A global recession could produce declining incomes and increasing unemployment which would 
reduce people’s purchasing power and lead to instances of food insecurity that would depend on 
the length and depth of the recession and the availability of savings, credit, and other safety nets. 
It is likely that the income shock could result in a decline in nutritional quality in some populations 
as poorer consumers “shift from more expensive and more nutritious foods, such as fruits, 
vegetables, meats and dairy products, to cheaper staples such as grains, sugar or roots and 
tubers” (Schmidhuber et al., 2020, pp. 7, 26) 
Poverty levels 
The world has made substantial progress on steadily reducing global poverty in the past 
thirty years, but recent forecasts of the impact of Covid-19 suggest that without 
significant action, 2020 could see the first annual increase in poverty levels since 1990 
(Sumner et al., 2020).  
The poorest segment of the population in a country is highly vulnerable in a crisis: they often 
suffer from poor health to begin with and their incomes and livelihoods are precarious; they are 
among the first to experience shortages of food and health care, and among the last to be 
reached by relief (Jonas, 2013, p. 13). People living in poverty have limited reserves to cope with 
shocks such as disease outbreaks (de la Fuente, Jacoby, & Lawin, 2019, p. 2). During the Ebola 
crisis in Liberia, for example, per capita food consumption and per capita total consumption fell 
more in areas with higher prevalence of the disease, ‘indicating that households did not have the 
means to completely self-insure against this (income) shock’, and rural poverty increased from 
70% to 82% following the crisis (de la Fuente et al., 2019, p. 19). 
The impacts of Covid-19 on employment are likely to be severe, with anywhere between 5 million 
and 25 million jobs lost along with labour income of US$860 billion to USD$3.4 trillion. Small and 
medium enterprises, the self-employed, daily wage earners, and workers in the informal sector 
will be hit particularly hard (UNSDG, 2020, p. 8). Small-scale surveys in the past two months 
report incomes of poor rural households in Pakistan falling by 90%, incomes of households in 
urban slums in Bangladesh falling by 80%, and incomes of another group of working poor across 
central Bangladesh falling by two-thirds (Malik et al., 2020, p. 3). 
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An IFPRI study completed in mid-April estimates that globally, if no preventative action is taken, 
more than 140 million people could fall into extreme poverty (measured against the $1.90 poverty 
line) in 2020, which would be an increase of 20% from present levels (Laborde et al., 2020) (see 
Figure 7).   
Figure 7: Potential impact of Covid-19 on extreme poverty (against the $1.90/day poverty line) 
 
Source: Laborde, Martin, & Vos, 2020. Reproduction for non-commercial purposes permitted. 
Similarly, a United Nations University study considering various scenarios for the income shock 
that could be produced by Covid-19 forecasts that a relatively small contraction of 5% in per 
capita income or consumption would be expected to increase the number of people living in 
poverty at the $1.90/day, $3.20/day, or $5.50/day international poverty lines by 85 million, 135 
million, or 124 million people respectively compared with 2018. Larger contractions in income 
would produce correspondingly higher poverty headcounts, up to 580 million at the $3.20/day 
poverty line for a 20% drop in per capita income (Sumner et al., 2020). 
Informal workers  
Informal employment3 is widespread in most low- and middle-income countries and is a 
critical source of livelihood for a large proportion of the population. Informal workers are 
                                                   
3 Informal employment is defined by the ILO as consisting of all wage employment and self-employment that is 
not registered, regulated or protected by existing legal or regulatory frameworks, as well as non-remunerative 
work undertaken in an income-producing enterprise. Informal workers do not have secure employment contracts, 
workers' benefits, social protection or workers' representation. (ILO, 2017) 
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particularly vulnerable during the Covid-19 crisis due to the insecurity of their work, lack 
of labour rights, and inability to rely on social safety nets. 
Globally, two billion people, making up 61% of the world’s employed people aged 15 and over, 
work in the informal economy. 86% of all employment in Africa, 68% of all employment in Asia 
and the Pacific, and 40% of all employment in the Americas is informal (ILO, 2018, p. 13). In 
India, well over half of GDP is produced in the informal sector, and three-quarters of rural 
households receive their main income from self-employment or casual labour (Ray, 
Subramanian, & Vandewalle, 2020, p. 2). In low- and lower-middle-income countries, slightly 
more women than men are in informal employment, but women are more often found working in 
more vulnerable situations as domestic workers, home-based workers, or contributing family 
workers (supporting a family business operated by another member of the household) (ILO, 
2018, pp. 20–21).  
Informal workers are often unable to maintain physical distancing in the crowded environments 
where they live and work, and have limited information about the virus and inadequate access to 
water and sanitation facilities or to protective equipment. They are often poor and lack the 
resources to stockpile food to cope with lockdown requirements, and are unable to access official 
support systems. They are vulnerable to mental health challenges due to health and economic 
uncertainties, and isolation as support systems break down due to lockdown. Some informal 
workers are migrants (either international, or rural-urban) and face losing incomes and housing 
as well as having become targets of violence. Official government disapproval of informal 
workers, especially street traders, is often manifested in police harassment including confiscation 
of goods, fines or physical violence and abuse. (WIEGO, 2020, p. 2) 
In late March and early April, the network organisation Women in Informal Employment: 
Globalizing & Organizing (WIEGO) carried out assessments of how Covid-19 was affecting 
informal workers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America through interviews with 21 national or local 
member-based organizations, five regional and global networks of informal workers’ 
organisations, and a research institute and an NGO that work closely with informal workers. The 
findings of this assessment are briefly summarised below. 
Home-based workers produce goods or services in or near their homes for local, domestic or 
global markets in many industries. Across Southeast Asia, home-based workers saw the price of 
their raw materials rise as soon as China entered lockdown, leading to a drop in profits (Moussié, 
2020; WIEGO, 2020, p. 4). As economic disruption spread, European and USA purchasers 
cancelled contracts with garment factories in Vietnam, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, leading 
to fewer or no orders for home-based workers. There has similarly been a decline in demand for 
all handicrafts and handmade products across Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe, particularly 
products related to the tourist industry. In South Africa, cooperatives that had been receiving 
monthly orders from social enterprises have been told that no work will be available during the 
lockdown period. Home-based workers who have still been able to work have found it difficult to 
collect orders and payments or buy materials due to lockdowns. Many home-based workers 
expect to have no work for at least the next six months (WIEGO, 2020, p. 4). 
Domestic workers are anxious not only about losing their own jobs, but also that their 
employers might lose theirs (WIEGO, 2020, p. 2). Domestic workers who live outside their 
employers’ homes or work part-time have been laid off without compensation across the 
Americas, Europe, Asia, and in South Africa. Other domestic workers are unable to work 
because they have to care for their own children, where schools and child-care facilities are 
closed. Live-in domestic workers in the Middle East and Southeast Asia report an increase in 
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paid care work, but this has come with a large increase in workload with all members of the 
employer’s family at home and workers are unable to take time off or leave the house because of 
lockdown restrictions. Migrant domestic workers have been trapped by border closures, either 
unable to travel from their home countries to the countries they work in, or vice-versa. Workers in 
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Mexico report a lack of protective equipment and no 
measures being taken in employers’ homes to limit the spread of coronavirus (Moussié, 2020; 
WIEGO, 2020, p. 3). 
Street vendors and market traders in many countries, especially non-food traders, have 
suffered as a result of governments closing markets to control the spread of Covid-19. In the 
process, forced evictions and police brutality against informal traders has been reported in 
Ghana, Liberia, India, Senegal, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, and some local governments in 
India have broken up street vending infrastructure so that street vendors will have nowhere to 
return to. Food vendors have been recognised as an essential service in some countries and 
have been permitted to operate. Market traders of all types report a lack of protective equipment 
available to them and greatly decreased sales due to customers avoiding public spaces. Shoe 
shiners in Mexico and newspaper vendors in Peru continue to work but report not earning 
enough in a day to cover the cost of public transport to get to work. Traders in some countries 
have had difficulty obtaining produce and other items to sell: police confiscated and destroyed 
farmers’ produce when farmers tried to take it to market in Zimbabwe, stockpiling and price-
gouging has increased the price of inputs for food vendors in Thailand and India, and cross-
border traders (and in India, traders who normally cross state borders within the country) cannot 
operate at all. (Moussié, 2020; WIEGO, 2020, pp. 1–2, 5–6, 8).  
Waste pickers, who earn a living collecting, sorting, and recycling trash, report (in South Africa, 
Colombia, Brazil, Ghana, Peru, and India) that the value chains that they feed recyclable 
materials into are collapsing: in some cases the warehouses and middlemen that they sell to 
have closed, and in many countries the prices offered for materials have dropped dramatically, in 
part due to lack of demand in international markets. Landfill sites in some countries are closed so 
waste pickers have no access. Safety is a concern due to a lack of protective equipment, 
difficulties maintaining distancing in warehouses and sorting facilities, and fears of coronavirus 
being spread via waste materials (Moussié, 2020; WIEGO, 2020, pp. 6–7). 
Remittances 
Remittances from overseas workers are very important to many low-income and middle-
income countries. In past crises, remittances have helped compensate for crises at home, 
but in the current situation, workers abroad are also vulnerable to losing their incomes. 
Globally, remittances are projected to drop by about 20% in 2020 due to falling wages and 
unemployment of migrant workers (World Bank, 2020b). 
Globally, remittances to low- and middle-income countries are worth three times as much as 
official development assistance, and worth as much as foreign direct investment while being 
much more stable (World Bank, 2019, pp. 14–15). In Myanmar, for example, 70% of rural 
households receive remittances from abroad, contributing to the incomes of 70% of the 
population (McCarthy, 2020, p. 2).  
In past crises, remittances have tended to be stable and counter-cyclical: workers abroad have 
been insulated from crises in their home countries and have been able to send money home to 
support family. The Covid-19 pandemic is unusual because of its global impact, as workers 
overseas are vulnerable to losing their incomes at the same time that the crisis is affecting their 
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home countries (World Bank, 2020b). Globally, remittances are projected to drop by about 20% 
in 2020 (World Bank, 2020b). The sharpest decline is expected in Europe and Central Asia 
(27.5%), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (23.1%), South Asia (22.1%), the Middle East and 
North Africa (19.6%), Latin America and the Caribbean (19.3%), and East Asia and the Pacific 
(13%) (World Bank, 2020b). 
Remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries, official development assistance, 
and private capital flows, 1990–2019 
 
Source: adapted from World Bank, 2019, p. 15, and World Bank, 2020c. The figure for 2018 is an estimate (‘e’); the figure for 
2019 is a forecast (‘f’). The projection of a 20% drop in remittances is based on World Bank, 2020c. Copyright International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, reproduction for noncommercial purposes permitted. 
Women and girls 
Women and girls are particularly vulnerable to economic hardship during the Covid-19 
pandemic. Around the world, women have less capacity to absorb economic shocks than 
men do: women ‘earn less, save less, hold less secure jobs, [and] are more likely to be 
employed in the informal sector’ where they have less protection (UN, 2020, p. 4). Women 
bear a greater burden of unpaid care work which limits their economic participation, and 
suffer increased incidences of gender-based violence during crises.  
Women’s jobs tend to be less secure than men’s. Women are over-represented in service sector 
industries such as retail, hospitality and tourism, where layoffs have already been acute (UN, 
2020, p. 4), and in precarious informal employment, particularly as domestic workers, home-
based workers, or informally supporting a family business (ILO, 2018, pp. 20–21).  
At home, women and girls typically take on disproportionate burdens of unpaid care work which 
prevent them from taking on income-generating work. They perform 76% of the total hours of 
unpaid care work, more than three times as much as men, and during public health crises, care 
burdens increase to include caring for the sick, for vulnerable elderly family members, and for 
children (Coalition for Women’s Economic Empowerment, 2020, p. 1). The impacts of disease-
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control measures such as closures of schools and childcare facilities fall primarily on women, 
who often have to abandon opportunities for paid work to care for children (Moussié, 2020).  
During the Ebola crisis of 2013, quarantines and other prevention measures significantly reduced 
women’s economic and livelihood activities, increased poverty rates, and exacerbated food 
insecurity, and while men’s economic activity returned to pre-crisis levels shortly after 
preventative measures subsided, the impacts on women’s economic security and livelihoods 
lasted much longer (UN, 2020, p. 4). In Sierra Leone, in villages that were highly disrupted by 
Ebola, the crisis led to higher rates of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and a persistent 16 
percentage point drop in school enrolment post-crisis (Bandiera, Buehren, Goldstein, Rasul, & 
Smurra, 2019). In Liberia, women experienced worse job losses and remained out of work longer 
than men, since women worked disproportionately in the hardest-hit sectors (Copley, Decker, & 
Delavelle, 2020).  
Gender-based violence tends to increase in emergencies, impeding women and girls from 
participating in economic activities. Stress and disruption caused by crises often exacerbate 
underlying norms that lead to gender-based violence. (Coalition for Women’s Economic 
Empowerment, 2020, p. 2) Lockdown measures increase the threat of domestic violence among 
women informal workers (WIEGO, 2020, p. 2). Some evidence is emerging from China and 
France that cases of domestic violence have increased during the Covid-19 crisis as a result of 
stay-at-home measures, and as in other crises, practices such as child marriage and survival sex 
rise as negative coping mechanisms. Gender-based violence can prevent women and girls from 
engaging in economic activities, decrease their productivity, and cause them to lose their 
earnings to abusers. (Coalition for Women’s Economic Empowerment, 2020, p. 2) 
Experience of previous crises and emerging current data suggest that ‘the Covid-19 global 
recession will result in a prolonged dip in women’s incomes and labour force participation, with 
compounded impacts for women already living in poverty’ (UN, 2020, p. 4). 
6. Vulnerability by country 
Various factors may influence a country’s vulnerability (or resilience) to economic shocks 
delivered by Covid-19. Raga and te Velde developed estimates of countries’ vulnerability to 
Covid-19 based on their degree of exposure to the virus, their economic exposure to China (as 
the original source of the pandemic), their economic openness to the rest of the world, and their 
economic strength and resilience (Raga & te Velde, 2020, p. 7). The chart below presents their 
assessment of vulnerability for the countries of interest in this report, which shows that Vietnam 
is the most vulnerable and Mexico the least. This analysis was developed in February when the 
disease was first emerging and most cases were located in China, hence the emphasis that it 
places on links to China; an update to this analysis could consider the greater spread of Covid-19 
outside of China today. 
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Figure 8: Vulnerability of countries to economic shocks caused by Covid-19 
 
Source: Author’s own, data taken from Raga & te Velde, 2020 (replotted from data in Appendix 1). The countries shown here 
are the focus countries of the UK Prosperity Fund for 2017-2023; Raga & te Velde analyse data for 97 countries.  
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